Cognitive Antagonism
Time to pull our minds together
I spend a lot of time for my work attending events.
Not the Ferrero Rocher-laden gala dinners to which I was accustomed at the Foreign Office (where I dedicated my attention principally to chasing crudités around the hall rather than trying to avoid saying crudities to our diplomatic guests*).
No, I often go to talks and lectures given by a variety of thinkers and writers, particularly on Ukraine and Russia, and information manipulation.
(I sometimes deliver presentations, on information operations and on Ukraine, and at those am particularly keen on stressing the fate of the enslaved Ukrainians in the east and south.)
I have attended two talks by journalists in the past couple of weeks, both of which stuck out. One was by Adam Fleming and Chris Morris on ‘misinformation’ (the most useless term, a distraction).
Fleming and Morris talked mainly of online harms and their dangers, though did acknowledge the threat of state actors and proxies and their interference in the UK information space. Both speakers appeared to criticise the Government for not handling the threat adequately (it is not), but at the same time appeared to caution against the authorities overreaching into the private sphere.
The latter, a Guardian event with Shaun Walker, Christo Grozev and Daniela Richterova on Russia’s sabotage networks across Europe, was equally strange.**
Image: Screen from the Guardian event, 22 May, author’s own (I don’t think I was allowed to photograph the participants, though the security in the hall was extremely erratic, excited, and atwitter)
Richterova (the second time I have seen her speak in the past couple of months) was once again brilliant in contextualising the Russian sabotage programme. What was crucial from her is her assessment that Russian sabotage has shifted from something tactical and reactive, mainly a way of dealing with dissidents such as Litvenenko, to something different: Richterova suggested that Moscow is now using sabotage strategically, with a real preparatory purpose. Her conclusion appeared to be that Russia is using such attacks as a planning for a greater war on Europe. It is astonishing that this problem is not being given critical, urgent attention.
Another mindscratcher is the criticism of Government that appeared to come from the Guardian panellists.
The panellists acknowledged that the Russian state is conducting violent operations against the UK and other countries, though during the talk did not talk at length about the overall implications that Richterova brought up. They also agreed that the UK Government is not doing enough to confront the threat.
There are several aspects to this that should exercise us, in terms of policy and methodologies.
It is not yet clear where the UK Government positions us in its thinking in terms of war with Russia, or how it defines ‘war’. My position—and I have mentioned before that I am not a specialist in military theory, operations, or history—is that ‘war’ should not just be understood as one country launching drones or firing missiles at another country in order to murder its civilians.
This is the main point I wish to make here: the problem, the Russia Problem, is so big and yet so specific that it needs a whole range of expertise to be brought together in order to confront one of the biggest existential threats the United Kingdom and Europe have ever faced. It needs generals who understand information manipulation, and specifically how Moscow does information manipulation. It needs commanders on the ground who can integrate their knowledge of Russian military tactics with a deep comprehension of the accompanying Russian information operations. Most of all, it requires an all-of-society approach, taking inspiration from the Baltics and Scandinavia.
Journalists in the UK are likely to agree with that, in principle. Indeed, I seem to remember that Fleming and Morris advocated this specifically.
However, journalistic criticism of Government, though sometimes warranted, demonstrates an antagonism and division in approaches to the problem. It is fine for Bellingcat to complain that government agents had not done enough to identify or stop the Skripal poisoners; however, civil servants (at the end of the day normal people) are tied by various laws, codes and regulations, departmental compliances, and government risk-avoidance (the ‘Daily Mail test’).
Moreover, the Civil Service is bound by the general Government concern of overstepping the flimsied boundary between official activities and personal freedoms, especially freedom of expression. The social media revolution has only complicated that balance, and Government has consistently failed to get it right.
Warnings by experts such as Richterova and Fiona Hill as to the nature of the threat, and as to where we are in the war with Russia, should mind politicians to reassess the competing needs between national security and media freedoms. Interpreting Moscow’s attempts to disrupt our country and its society as a war, and a careful assessment of Russian plans to increase its military and other activity against us, should inspire HMG to increase defensive capabilities, integrating our work against all types of hostile operations. In short, we are at war, we have a war foisted upon us. We must all face that Moscow has a special place in its operations for the UK and the British people: and its ire is growing.
The Government faced severe issues managing media freedoms during the Second World War (this piece on the Ministry of Information is short but enlightening), though was able to encourage support and a principle of self-enforcement from the press.
Most of the UK population want the Government to defend us from attack—from the social collapse that Moscow wants to see on our streets. But Government cannot increase capability without extending work into collection and analysis of various data that might in peacetime raise concerns over personal privacy. Civil servants, for example, are barred from examining certain components of social media, opening up significant gaps in Government understanding of the threat. Government open source teams cannot compete with nongovernmental rivals; the latter, unrestricted by internal remit and the limitations of tight official definitions of ‘open source’, are able to buy hacked databases, act upon their creativity, contact personally witnesses. Government at the moment cannot do this—and journalists would be the first to point ‘Big Brother’ fingers if they did.
Agencies with special investigative powers are under-resourced and do not have specialist awareness of some of the informational threats or the appropriate skills. In any case, intelligence agencies are still unable to investigate anyone without due legal process and internal compliance.
A new dedicated unit to counter information manipulation
I have written elsewhere and submitted to Parliament that the only way to get round this is to establish a dedicated unit to examine and counter the information threat, elevating our response in effect to a war footing and giving it such a unit statutory powers. This would be a starting point to integrating our capabilities across Government to counter Russia.
However, such a response can only work if journalists cooperate more with Government, supporting the fact that HMG at this time must rebalance its powers for the good of national security. Journalists and Government departments, essentially wanting the same thing, must explain their work more openly with each other, being honest about intent and constraints. A proposed dedicated unit should have a specific function to work alongside journalists to explain its functions, methodologies (where not sensitive), and findings, and to share knowledge and best practices.
The Strategic Review
The UK Government is exceptionally good at policy and programmatic planning, with highly-trained officials working extremely hard to lay down frameworks for work to support the people. Other countries cry out for this knowledge and these skills, and I have seen how our Government supports others in training other functionaries and exporting our experience.
The Government is less good sometimes at realising its carefully-crafted policies and implementing its well-intentioned ideas in complex circumstances. I have often worked on policy documents, only to see structured recommendations ignored on situational imperatives.
Government is also less good sometimes at explaining its work to journalists. There seems to be an imbedded belief on both sides that their existences are innately opposed.
The response to the forthcoming Strategic Review will be a crucial test case for the Government. It will demonstrate how the Government is able to push forward with its Civil Service on translating policy thinking into practical programming and nimble implementation. It will also demonstrate the Government’s ability to integrate its thinking and planning across various departments, particularly between No. 10/Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office.
One of the key things that the Strategic Review must address is the Government’s timidity and reluctance to be proactive in this war on Russia. We must be bolder in undermining Russian capability, not just responding to their specific operations. Journalists—including the ones mentioned above, whose work I greatly admire—do a spectacular job in their investigations and in the direction of their thinking. Civil Servants—almost entirely hard-working, honest, dedicated, underappreciated, and highly bright people—perform a crucial, unseen, role in helping defend us.*** **** Just the focus of these various groups is specific, siloed.
I hope the Strategic Review is more than just a document, and presents a framework to translate policy thinking into action. More importantly, I hope the Strategic Review lays the basis of concrete ways in which different expertises can pull their minds together to tackle this threat: it is too all-encompassing and too specific to tackle individually.
* Idea for a coffee-table book: a guide to cuisine diplomacy and the way various Embassies use gala dinners to impress guests. Bonus for me: I get to go round
** This post is meant constructively, and is not a hit or attack on any of the people mentioned, all of whom do incredible work. Shaun Walker has a new book out: The Illegals: Russia's Most Audacious Spies and Their Century-Long Mission to Infiltrate the West. I have not read it yet, but I suspect it is very important. I must read Richterova’s Watching the Jackals: Prague's Covert Liaisons with Cold War Terrorists and Revolutionaries. You can and should find the work of the other people mentioned here.
*** There is more to the Foreign Office than gala dinners.
**** There’s more to life, you know, than drinks parties at the Foreign Office.
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