Fuelling the Fire in the ‘DNR’
Responses to petrol prices in the enslaved area give some insight into attitudes towards the local authorities
The situation surrounding transport, cars, and petrol, is a good indicator of wider social developments in a country. This is especially the case for Ukraine, and for our understanding of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic the ‘DNR’.
Such indicators, partially data-based and partially anecdotal, are particularly helpful, when used with caution, where it is becoming increasingly difficult to get masses of interpretable information out of the ‘DNR’.
(That being said, the ‘DNR’ and the other temporarily enslaved regions are not black holes, and the tightening situation there does not mean that directing research there is pointless. On the contrary, we need more research, carefully targeted. We also require new joint methodologies, across government and partners, to interpret findings, especially on social attitudes and their relations to the authorities.)
People in the ‘DNR’ frequently express concerns about petrol prices, certainly in the many Telegram channels that I follow. (Telegram is perhaps the most ephemeral of platforms and the easiest to use in enslaved Ukraine.)
Cars appear particularly important in the ‘DNR’ and all the enslaved areas. Other options to get around, and into Russia, are limited, and public transport is reportedly highly unreliable.
Petrol prices
This possibly explains the attention by social media (especially Telegram) users to the prices of petrol in the ‘DNR’.
Of course, the worsening water crisis has deflected some attention from the prices of fuel and utilities in the ‘DNR’.
(As an offtopic, the water shortage has become so dire that the mayor of Moscow has sent emergency supplies.)
Image: Screenshot from video Mash Telegram channel, 28 July (reportedly showing crowds in Makiivka awaiting emergency supplies of water from the Moscow mayor)
People in the ‘DNR’ appear particularly sensitive to rises in petrol prices. Each increase is met by a series of comments and jokes on Telegram: such remarks do not tend to criticise the ‘DNR’ leaders personally, and certainly do not attack or even mention Russian President Vladimir Putin or the Russian authorities.
Image: Screenshot from Khuyevyi Donetsk Telegram channel, 3 July (‘Fuck, they’ve gone up’)
The shape of the Telegram environment gives some insight into the nature of how people there relate to the ‘DNR’ leadership. There is room on some nonofficial platforms to express dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, though this seems firmly restricted within the current social contract enforced by the enslaving powers.
The Khuyevyi Donetsk Telegram channel responded quickly to news of the price rises with memes, suggesting that there are some outlet for exasperation, as long as it is expressed carefully.
Image: Screenshot from video from Khuyevyi Donetsk Telegram channel of someone riding a horse through the town, 3 July (‘When you’ve seen the petrol prices. Kalininskiy district’)
The sardonic nature of the comments continued.
Image: Screenshot from video from Khuyevyi Donetsk Telegram channel of a fancy car, 3 July (‘And they say that our lives are fucked’)
Enslaved people in the ‘DNR’ have struggled with high prices, low wages, and poverty—in particular child poverty— for many years, since the invasion in 2014. Contacts there have regularly told me about how difficult it is to afford quality food, especially meat. The authorities have seemingly managed this, likely by focusing on help to priority constituents and steadfastly ignoring groups of people they consider insignificant. It is not possible to tell how long they will be able to manage these, but it seems pressures persist.
The new immolation
I have previously discussed the extreme difficulties in understanding how messages on nonofficial Telegram represent wider social attitudes, and how attitudes and beliefs feed into actual behaviours. The social situation within the ‘DNR’ is unique and highly complex. However, it is likely that the Kremlin and local authorities devote many resources into studying social attitudes within the area, and have developed good knowledge of these.
One macabre side story of looking into news on petrol was the discovery of at least three recent incidents in the ‘DNR’ of people using petrol to set on fire jilting lovers and the vexatious vicinage. Also cats: across Russia they seem to enjoy feline immolation.
It is unclear whether this marks a trend or new development. I cannot remember previous examples of petrol being used like this as a weapon. Again, this highlights the dangers of using specifics to formulate analytical conclusions, particular within enslaved Ukraine.
The temptation is there to describe this as a normalisation of violence in a new world where the Kremlin uses savagery to obtain its policy priorities. Moscow has pushed the entire region—and possibly the world—into a new state where civilised discourse has been replaced by coercion and violence.
Many of these cases involve rivalries between former partners, neighbours, and work colleagues. This is perhaps the point: Moscow has long had a strategy of exacerbating and weaponising difference, encouraging people to react to differences with aggression. Perhaps this inability to balance heterology with homology is partially why its attempts to russify parts of Ukraine and integrate the Ukrainians are failing.
This use of violence across Ukraine is particularly worrying, as it is impossible to know how this goes on, and how this will impact the population there, including the young. There is little positive to say about this, and we need to understand more about the situation.