What the Russian Presidential Elections Tell Us

That things will likely get much, much worse

This piece took time to complete, given work and other things that came up. Attention has been superseded by the horrendous attack in Moscow last Friday, but this note is still relevant.

People will continue to question the connection between the election and the attack in Moscow. Any evidence of a false-flag operation by Moscow is almost certain never to appear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was - despite his evident anger - careful enough in his 23 March evening address only to hint at the bombings in 1999, which in effect provided the basis for Putin’s first electoral bid (what many people refer to as the ‘Ryazan Sugar’ affair). Ukraine’s GUR, its defence intelligence agency, had no such reservations, and was quick to blame Russia’s intelligence services.

Time will tell how the Kremlin exploits the Moscow tragedy specifically in its brutal attack on Ukraine. It is almost certain that Russia launched an information operation quickly after the attack to undermine reports that ISIS was responsible, thereby paving the way for Putin to implicate Kyiv. This informational attack was the thing that initially most riled Kyiv, it seems. What comes next in terms of kinetic attacks is impossible to predict - though it does not look good.

The elections were about the numbers

So Putin won, and there should be little surprise about the numbers. The Presidential Administration had set KPIs for the elections in a number of areas, including for the percentage of votes Putin should be awarded. Putin was given around 77% in 2018, and it was clear that this time around, any figure less than the high 80%s would be a disaster.

The Kremlin was too careful and too skilled to allow that to happen.

In addition, state-run opinion polls – carefully disseminated to manipulate people into thinking that the overwhelming majority of the population support Putin – had accurately predicted the final results. Such polls also act to repress any dissent, pressuring potential opposition into believing that they are extremely isolated.

In that regard, the elections suggest that Kremlin is currently too effective and experienced to permit any significant shocks, surprises or social upheavals in these types of processes. That, for me right now, is a cause of deep pessimism. The elections also suggest that the Kremlin has demonstrated its ability to react skilfully to the unexpected and manage a range of risks (I’m beginning to think that disasters do not happen at Putin.) More of that below.

So, why there should be little surprise about the numbers – and why are they important?

I see the Kremlin’s intent as focused primarily – but not exclusively internally.

Turnout was initially key - in order to demonstrate support for the process. Turnout is also more difficult to falsify.

But principally, I see Putin’s regime now as relying on domination and intimidation. This is not just a way to consolidate rule and repress opponents. I think that there is a large part of the new Kremlin methodology of rule that gains political, social and personal gratification from displaying power and demanding public humiliation in return.

Domination and humiliation have been crucial to Putin’s rule since at least February 2022, and probably even longer. We remember Sergey Naryshkin stumbling over his words as Putin publicly mocked him over Naryshkin’s inability to express clearly his support for the succession of the Donbas ‘republics’. That gruesome spectacle seems in retrospect to have laid the foundation of ritualistic humiliation and penance which seems so important in Russian society at the moment. Take the public apologies of the participants of the Almost Naked party, especially Filipp Kirkorov, and the way they framed their obsequious performances before Russian troops. I’ll write more about humiliation in Russian society later.

To me, then, the election results were a social ritual of mass dominance, a performance in which the people were supposed to play their role. This is why the size of Putin’s victory matters, regardless of the fact that it was implausible. In fact, the more implausible, the better. The Kremlin no longer cares about what people know or understand about fraud or the legitimacy of the elections. The Kremlin no longer cares about what people think, or whether they like Putin. The Kremlin now demands displays of its omnipotence. Showing its ability to post ridiculous results is a clear demonstration of that.

Key to this is fear. My friends and contacts in Russia have related to me that they are increasingly scared. The Kremlin is now able to use fear incredibly effectively and in novel ways to force people into this role. And in many ways, it wants to be feared. The leadership’s demand for the correct response from the people helps explain the fervent anger it held towards Aleksey Navalnyy. Navalnyy refused to obey the rules and perform the rituals; he refused to display fear – and this is why the Kremlin had to destroy him.

What the elections tell us of Putin’s view of the international community

I argued last week that the predominant purpose for the elections was internal messaging, as a signal to the people that opposition is minimal and divergent, and in essence as part of the attempt to message domination.

There is another important aspect of this, however, that is worth underlining here. These new Russian elections are meant to send an important signal to the international community, and it is not about legitimating Putin’s rule. These modern Russian elections are very unlike Soviet exercises, which were designed to convey the illusion of democracy.

The Kremlin has used these recent elections in a different way. Rather than claiming legitimacy for Putin and a place in the international community, it has used their calculated barbarity and cynicism in a deliberate snub to Ukraine’s allies. The brutally high numbers that Putin got are the clearest sign yet that Putin no longer wants to be part of the club of transatlantic nations, and that he does not care what we think. They are also a likely signal to us that he intends to push on Ukraine. That should worry us all.

A digression

I’ll see here a quick word about opposition solidarity and why it is so important that Putin undermines that.

It is crucial to opposition to Putin, given that it has very little ways now to mobilise, to demonstrate that they are not isolated. To people that are upset with the Kremlin, one of the most demoralising feelings is that they are alone, and that nobody else shares their views. Even symbolic gestures of opposition can make much difference in showing others, even tacitly, that they are not on their own.

This is why the Noon Against Putin effort, vilified by many oppositionists outside the country, performed a deliberate and important function. It was an attempt to counter the Kremlin’s attempt to isolate and atomise potential opponents, and also to force the view that opposition to Putin is not only minimal, but socially divergent. The protest clearly had no impact in the short term – but I don’t think that was its purpose. It intended to show increasingly repressed people that they should not despair totally, and that there are others who feel that way.

The real practical problem going forward, of course, is that Putin opponents need a means to convert emotional solidarity into a coherent opposition movement. And it does not look like this will happen soon.

Countering shocks

The final point, as I mentioned above, is that the elections told us that the Kremlin is very skilled currently at minimising surprises, and managing shocks when they do arise.

There was very little unexpected in these polls, given the Kremlin’s careful reliance on technocratic means, information manipulation, and fear.

However, there were some surprises.

Putin had no choice about the main competition when he ran in 2000. I was working in the UK Government at the time, and in 2000 we wondered before the polls whether Putin would get the 50%+ votes required to avoid a run-off against the Communists. How times have changed.

I had suspected that Putin would ensure that in the latest elections he had a group of elderly men as his staged contenders. I was surprised when Davankov eventually made it onto the final list, given his youth and at least ambivalent views on the war. Once polling started, I wondered whether Davankov would secure a high number of votes to at least demonstrate some disillusionment with the war – possibly around 8%. I overestimated that, and I think the Kremlin’s ability to keep that score low shows the extent to which Putin has made taboo any discussions of the war ending now.

The other test to the Kremlin was the hopeful attempt by Nadezhdin to run. He did not stand a chance of making the list, but the fact that the Kremlin swatted away his – and Yekaterina Duntsova’s efforts without barely any marked public outrage, I think is a very worrying sign of just how the Kremlin at the moment can manage – not beliefs – but behaviours.

All this is extremely concerning, both for the future of Russia but also for the future of Ukraine. I do waver between pessimism and even greater pessimism when I think about how Russia will descend further from here – and what that means for its aggression against the rest of Europe. To my mind, governments and populations in the UK and Europe are still miles from where they should be at evaluating the real threat from Moscow, and what comes next. If these elections were not a sign to us that we should be extremely concerned, I do not what could be.