When Russian Information Manipulation Is Right
Spoiler: It's not what you think, but welcome to the new reality (thank you, America)
Make no mistake, what is happening now marks an extraordinary success for Russian information manipulation. They were right, and we were wrong.
Partially, at least. But significantly so: on the levels they wanted, in the ways they wanted, and in the ways that count.
We have fixated so long on responding to Russian ‘disinformation’, the short-term manipulation of factual veracity, that we missed the real problem.
I have to point the finger at myself and others who have worked in Government for years, trying to develop the best ways to form coalitions to mitigate Russian information manipulation. The key is now to pick up on where we failed, examine those vulnerabilities in the context of the UK’s and allies’ new policy priorities, and try to close these vulnerabilities as we go forward. And we are doing this midstream, with hands tied behind our backs.
We did not understand that Russian information manipulation works on a variety of different levels. Nor did we grasp the complexity of how these different strands of information manipulation interact with each other; actors can operate with long-term strategic patience, but they are also agile enough to work at short notice, responding with creativity to various events and exploiting tactical advantages as opportunities arise.
More on that complex interaction below.
Correspondingly and crucially, we have siloed ‘disinformation’ work into its own narrow field, examining top-end open-source feeds for the basis of our responses, ignoring the fact that fighting Russian manipulation requires a holistic approach.
The entire Russian state machine relies on a complex combination of information manipulation, bribery, media co-option, intelligence operations, cyberattacks and hacking, blackmail, military force, cognitive coercion, fear; the Russian state throws everything it can at this. And we are unprepared.
When Russian Information Manipulation Is Right
‘Disinformation’ is clearly a partial approach and a flawed basis on which to approach the problem. Focusing on factual untruths and responding to them — as government teams have previously been set up — is a ridiculous waste of resources.
The key issue is the manipulation of perception, of worldviews, of the cultural bases on which people view the structure of societies around them and where they think these are unjust.
These worldviews rely on a complex system of beliefs that are formulated by exposure to various types of cultural interaction, including traditional media, social media, engagement with friends, family, colleagues, and more.
What to me is interesting is how manipulative sources can help create and consolidate those worldviews over time, but then rely on specific moments in order to reinforce them. The interaction of strategic and tactical messaging, to my mind, is likely highly effective in justifying and reinforcing the realities that have been constructed over time.
Realities is an appropriate word. Information manipulation deals with creating new realities in people’s minds, then indicating specific moments that seemingly hold up that outlook.
This is where Moscow has, critically, succeeded, through a mixture of violence and messaging wrapped around its kinetic operations, to enforce a new ‘reality’ about Ukraine: first in people’s minds, then in governments’ policy.
Take, for example, reporting (by the odious Oleg Tsaryev on his Telegram channel) on an interview by the infandous Andrey Kelin, Russia’s ambassador to London, in which Kelin insists that the world comes to terms with the ‘territorial realities’ that Russia now controls parts of Ukraine.
(It is incredible that British media still air Kelin, given that media discourse is supposed to be the honest exchange and questioning of ideas: there is no purpose engaging with someone whose words are completely and deliberately divorced from a shared reality, which is why Russian diplomacy is just coercive manipulation and should not be broadcast. Believing that Kelin is engaging honestly with media is in itself a form of manipulation.)
But what is important here is how Moscow has shifted reality and forced people to accept that as if it was the natural and irrevocable state of affairs. They are encouraging us to believe that their vision of historical inevitably is correct. They have used a brutal military conquest to reinforce that argument. But we should not fall into this trap: but, through intellectual and moral weakness, we do.
All information manipulation and propaganda is historically-framed, in that it sets out to create a new vision of history which frames and encloses its targets’ beliefs. The Russians, having a strong sense of history in their political and social culture, are masters at this. The perils of adopting their history are inestimable, and demand a mass effort of will.
The American connection
Holding up coalitions are crucial in the informational sphere, as well as militarily. We are not concerned with countering Russian disinformation, but with substantiating and justifying our vision of how the world should be structured and shaped in history.
UK policy has been built upon building coalitions in the informational sphere, and much Foreign Office work has been devoted to bringing partners on board in how we respond to Russian information manipulation.
We have now, however, entered a new world where much messaging from the US Government has entwined itself with Russian messaging, substantiating and reinforcing with what Moscow says. We need to understand this new complex US-Russian informational network, though policy towards this is likely to be extremely difficult.
Take for example this, the mutual reinforcement of what Americans and Russians say, as US Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg reportedly acknowledges that the world ‘cannot return to the past and must work from the reality of the situation as it is now’.
This reinforcement of the worst strands of Russian messaging are, to me, the most pernicious, as what Moscow says appears to be picked up and acknowledged by US officials, thereby justifying their most outrageous comments.
Take, even more pertinently, how Vice-President JD Vance in that White House meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, lambasted Zelenskyy with a range of long-standing arguments that came from Russia — and make no mistake about that — but leveraged them at the best tactical moment to try to prove at that specific moment that Zelenskyy’s conduct only justified what people believe.
(Here again, as if it needs saying, the three main overriding arguments that Vance made — that Ukraine is disrespectful, ungrateful, and risks World War III, are only things that the worse Russians have been trying to argue for years.)
American affirmation also gives a significant confidence boost to Russian agents, helping them in their quest to shift realities. It also helps them claim that their previous predictions were correct, giving them retrospective justification (and helping justify their funding), but also giving weight to their further claims as to how history will shape out.
The First Telegram War: in which Russia leveraged that platform to win. The prominent pro-war Telegram channel Starshe Eddy claims that Trump has recognised that Russian Telegram was correct all along, by claiming that Zelenskyy is a dictator and is launching an unwinnable war for his own personal gain. The channel also claims that Trump is a subscriber
(It is noticeable that pro-Russian Telegram channels lately appear to have stopped creating their own material — it is almost as if they have all gone on holiday, as they seem to be reprinting mainly what US media report on what American politicians say.)
What to do
The Russians have been working on this for generations, and we are not going to undermine their work overnight. The below are some burgeoning ideas which require a collective thought and a holistic approach.
1. Understand better the different levels on which Russian information manipulation works, and the complex interaction between different strands of messaging. Unfortunately, we shall have to spend more money on detailed behavioural science and other related research*, though these relatively small amounts, if research is tailored well, will be highly beneficial.
2. Use this understanding to refocus work from counter-disinformation and fact-checking. Respond to tactical disinformation only when it is likely to be effective by plugging into more deep-seated cultural beliefs and is more likely to have impact.
3. The UK and European governments are going to have to take a risk and undertake work to understand the new interactions between US and Russian messaging, and try to mitigate those in a consolidated manner.
4. The UK and Europe will have to understand better likely future efforts by Russia to undermine the growing coalition between London and the continent and build up capabilities and mitigations now.
5. London must undertake real and convincing public diplomacy to explain and pull support behind its efforts to defend the country from increasing Russian aggression. It must tie those efforts and expenses honestly to our national interests, making a convincing case why directing resources to help Ukraine will make us wealthier in the long-run. This will be a tough and long effort, but no doubt the Russians will be preparing to argue the contrary, and we must get ahead of them.
* I am not a behavioural scientist…
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